Making War to Keep Peace Read online

  As President George W. Bush has said, “Freedom is once again assaulted by enemies determined to roll back generations of democratic progress. Some call this evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant Jihadism; still others, Islamo-fascism.3 This global threat confronting us today tests and weakens the fragile foundation of the idyllic and hopeful dream that peace can be kept without making war.”

  1

  IRAQ INVADES KUWAIT

  On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait shattered the peace and optimism of the summer. This was the first clear act of international aggression after the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had ended the cold war. The United States, the Gulf States, and their allies were not ready for the invasion. To some Americans, it recalled Hitler’s swift moves across Europe at the start of World War II and the consequences of appeasing an aggressor. To others, it recalled the Soviet Union’s surprise invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the long, terrible war that followed.

  The story of how President George H.W. Bush and the United States responded to this foreign policy challenge is a chronicle of the birth of the new world order. It raises the fundamental questions of how the United States decides what is in its national interest, when it should use military force, the nature of our relationship with the United Nations and the world, and how long our responsibilities to a nation or people persist after military intervention. The crisis also offers an object lesson on the danger of waiting for international consensus when time is of the essence.

  President Bush’s initial response resembled that of Harry Truman when North Korean forces attacked South Korea in 1950. “By God,” Truman said, “I’m going to let them have it!” Later, more introspectively, Truman wrote: “If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged, it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the Second World War.”1

  Saddam Hussein’s invasion was not part of a global contest between two superpowers. But it was a clear-cut case of aggression, and Bush had to act.

  In fact, Bush was an activist. He hated bullies and was prepared to use American power unilaterally to bring them to order. When Manuel Noriega stole the elections in Panama in 1989, the Organization of American States (OAS) did nothing.2 When Noriega “declared war” on the United States and murdered a U.S. serviceman in the Canal Zone, Bush moved quickly. He was not inhibited by the lack of an OAS resolution of approval and seemed little concerned when Democratic congressmen complained about the use of force without multinational sanctions.

  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was a clear act of aggression across an international border, but in this case its meaning for the United States was less clear. Panama was in our own neighborhood, and the two countries had special ties. The United States had played a role in the creation of Panama, and the canal was built in large measure by U.S. citizens and with American money. Iraq was on the other side of the globe—not part of an historic American sphere of interest.

  THE FIRST POST–COLD WAR CONFLICT

  Desert Storm was not the war the United States had planned for. Before 1989, strategic thinkers had assumed a continuing political-military competition with an expansionist Soviet Union that was ready to exploit any weakness and profit from any crisis. Containing Soviet expansion and regional violence had been the principal goal of U.S. policy for decades. The Soviet Union had been our main adversary in a global struggle, but Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was not caused by Soviet expansionism.

  Iraq was neither an historic enemy of the United States nor a global power, but Saddam Hussein nevertheless posed a serious challenge. He was a ruthless ruler with a boundless appetite for power and an unlimited capacity for violence, a man who needed war like fire needs oxygen. He had made war against his own countrymen; for eight years he made war against Iran; now he made war against Kuwait. Saddam made no distinction between legal and illegal weapons; military and civilian targets; children and adults; men and women; Persians, Kurds, Jews, and Arabs. All within his reach were potential targets. His powerful army threatened the Gulf oil that was vitally important to Europe and Asia; his attack on Kuwait dramatized the vulnerability of traditional regimes in the area.

  Bush himself had a long-standing interest in the Persian Gulf, especially Kuwait. He had spent time in the region and knew the rulers and the oil companies. It was clear to him that something had to be done to undo the aggression. But this would be much more difficult than any previous use of force in his administration—it would be a global confrontation, with global implications.

  Until then, the United States had preserved normal relations with this repressive government, though Bush and most other Americans disapproved of the Iraqi regime for its autocratic character, brutal practices, use of chemical weapons against Iran, and repeated threats of violence against Israel. Bush had signed a Presidential Directive on October 2, 1989, that found normal relations with Iraq to be in the U.S. interest.3 The Bush team believed that political realism sometimes required the United States to deal with unsavory regimes in the interest of strategic goals. Bush saw his policy as essentially a continuation of the Reagan administration’s; the Bush team and the State Department had hoped that a policy of cooperation would moderate the policies of the government of Iraq.4 America’s principal allies had followed suit, tilting toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.

  But neither the conciliatory policy of the Western nations, nor the offer of new credits using enhanced trade relations and economic incentives, induced better behavior from Iraq. Instead, Saddam grew bolder and more threatening. On April 2, 1990, he publicly confirmed that Iraq possessed chemical weapons, which he had already used against Iran and against Iraqi dissidents. He also threatened that, if attacked, “We will make the fire eat up half of Israel.”5 Still, U.S. policy toward Iraq continued to emphasize American flexibility.

  Saddam decided on an easier target than Israel. By mid-July 1990, evidence had begun to accumulate of his hostile intentions toward Saudi Arabia, as well as a buildup of Iraqi troops and weapons along the border with Kuwait. He began by emphasizing grievances and demands: Kuwait must stop stealing Iraqi oil from the Ramali oil field and must repay the $2.4 billion it had “stolen.” The good intentions and official assurances that the United States desired “to improve relations with Iraq,”6 issued by U.S. ambassador April Glaspie and echoed by other western powers, failed to deter Saddam, however, and the Gulf states were reluctant to make defensive moves. Only the United Arab Emirates (UAE) asked the United States for a demonstration of support and cooperated in a joint exercise with U.S. naval forces.

  Kuwait—small, vulnerable, and essentially defenseless—was an easy mark. On August 2, 1990, after the appeals of other governments had failed, Iraqi troops swept into Kuwait on the flimsy pretext of restoring the historic borders of greater Iraq. Kuwait immediately called on the United States and other friendly nations for help, invoking the self-defense provision of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter:

  Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.7

  That same day, by a 10 to 0 vote, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660, condemning Iraq’s aggression and calling for an immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops. The resolution contained strong language but made no threat of force to counter force. This attack on a nonaggressive Arab brother added to a growing list of indications that the Iraqis intended to move soon on Saudi Arabia. On August 5, Bush said flatly, “This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.”8 The next day, the Security Council passed Resolution 661 by a vote of 13 to 0, reaffirming the right of indiv
idual or collective self-defense in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (the chapter under which forceful measures are authorized), the Security Council imposed mandatory economic sanctions on Iraq, including a trade and financial embargo on all but medical and humanitarian goods and payments.9 Cuba and Yemen abstained, but the lopsided majority, including all five permanent members, testified to the unusual degree of unity in the Security Council.

  On August 8, Bush announced the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Shield to deter an attack on that country and block Iraq’s advance while the embargo took its toll. In his memoir, Bush’s secretary of state, James Baker, described his concern about the “formidable political realities” of the crisis. Baker said he reminded Bush, “[T]his has all the ingredients that brought down three of the last five presidents: a hostage crisis, body bags, and a full-fledged economic recession caused by forty-dollar oil.”10 Bush knew the risks but was determined to take whatever action was necessary.

  Baker describes the Bush team’s strategy: “We would begin with diplomatic pressure, then add economic pressure, to a great degree organized through the United Nations, and finally move toward military pressure by gradually increasing American troop strength in the Gulf.” This approach would “lead a global political alliance aimed at isolating Iraq.”11 Eventually, in the military phase, five hundred thousand U.S. troops and several hundred thousand soldiers from twenty-five other countries were assembled in the Saudi desert.

  Bush’s strong words and determination surprised even some of his own aides. He later said, “I had decided…in the first hours that the Iraqi aggression could not be tolerated…I came to the conclusion that some public comment was needed to make clear my determination that the United States must do whatever might be necessary to reverse the Iraqi aggression.”12

  Bush’s bold statement that Saddam’s invasion “will not stand”—made without consulting Congress or the Security Council—was a giant step toward a major U.S. military commitment in the Gulf, and toward a new world order in which such outrages would not go unpunished.

  Bush Saw Vital U.S. Interests in Kuwait

  The stakes were high for Bush. At issue were the independence of the Gulf states and the control of their oil; the Arab governments’ ability to act in their own self-defense; Bush’s capacity for effective leadership in confronting a major military and diplomatic challenge; the Europeans’ capacity to act in their own interest; the ability of all to mount a collective action through the United Nations; and the future of Saddam Hussein, his dangerous government, his powerful army, and his capacity to establish hegemony in the Gulf. Bush repeatedly stated that this action would serve as a precedent for dealing with future aggression. “We will succeed in the Gulf,” he said in his State of the Union speech in late January 1991. “And when we do, the world community will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present and future, who contemplates outlaw aggression. The world can therefore seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order—where brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective resistance.”13

  So George Bush assumed leadership of a campaign to counter Saddam Hussein’s invasion of a small country on the other side of the world in which the United States had important, but not vital, interests. Why? Because through years of service in government he had grown accustomed to the idea of the United States as the world leader; because U.S. presidents since Eisenhower had defined the Persian Gulf as an area of vital interest; because Bush had personal experience in the area and hated bullies; and because he supported the idea of a collective response and believed he could carry out a collective action through the UN.

  Many Americans and others believed that Bush acted because the United States needed to preserve its access to the Gulf region’s oil, but it was the world that needed that access. At that time, the United States got only 13 percent of its oil from the Middle East.14 Japan, in contrast, received 70 percent of its oil from the region, and other U.S. allies were heavily dependent on Middle East oil.15 The interests that made the president act were broader than oil and less tangible. He believed that the United States had a national interest in world order, peace, and American leadership.16 The conquest of Kuwait would give Iraq control of 20 per-cent of the world’s known oil reserves, and Iraq clearly had designs on Saudi Arabia’s oil as well.

  Still, taking the United States into war was an awesome responsibility. Disputes among Americans over the use of force had been bitter since the Vietnam War sparked the antiwar movement that led a demoralized Lyndon Johnson to retire rather than seek reelection in 1968. These disputes spoiled the Democratic Convention in 1968, split the Democratic Party, and prepared the way for Richard Nixon’s electoral victories in 1968 and 1972. They inspired university riots and embittered U.S. politics at every level, destroying the habitual civility that characterized American political life. The result was widespread reluctance among politicians to use force—a reluctance that came to be called the “Vietnam syndrome” and that affected the attitudes of both the Carter and Reagan administrations toward the use of force.

  Reagan’s secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, articulated the following principles—the Weinberger Doctrine—to govern the use of U.S. military forces through the eight years of Reagan’s presidency:

  The engagement must be deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.

  We should put forces in combat only if we did so wholeheartedly and with a clear intention of winning.

  We should have clearly defined objectives.

  We should reassess the relation between our objectives and forces and maintain a clear preponderance of force.

  We must have the support of the American people and Congress.

  The commitment of forces should be a last resort.17

  As Reagan’s vice president for eight years, Bush was very familiar with these principles, as was Weinberger’s chief of staff, General Colin Powell. Marginally altered, the principles came to be called the Powell Doctrine, and they guided Bush as he led the country into war. Bush made two significant additions: He sought a mandate from the UN Security Council specifically authorizing military action, and he assembled a multinational force (for symbolic as well as military reasons). Bush deferred action until all alternatives to war had been exhausted, but it was clear from the beginning that he was determined to secure the withdrawal of Iraqi forces.

  There were differences in the Bush administration over whether Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait was an adequate cause for the United States to become involved in war. Powell saw containing Saddam in Kuwait and protecting Saudi Arabia as the objectives, and favored delaying or avoiding military action. Baker generally agreed with Powell.18 Bush, however, thought Iraq’s forces must withdraw from Kuwait.

  Authorization to Use Force

  The most pressing question was whether the United States and its allies should undertake military action under Article 51 immediately or wait until they had explicit Security Council authorization for the use of force. Even though Article 51 recognizes the right of a state to self-defense and collective defense against aggression, some lawyers argued that forceful action requires explicit permission from the Security Council. Bush was committed to collective action through the UN, as was Baker.19

  Baker wrote, “There was no doubt in my mind the President would authorize force if necessary—and we were very careful all along to preserve our options under Article 51 of the UN Charter.”20 Baker wanted the United States to act as part of a coalition that would share the burden. “There was simply no percentage” in going it alone, 21 he wrote, although his opposition to unilateral action was a matter of practical considerations rather than principle. Without a broad multilateral coalition, Baker argued, “we would never have achieved the sort of solidarity from the Arab nations that was crucial to isolating Saddam.”22 He worried that Arab
anger would be turned against the United States, and he pointed out to Saudi Arabia’s ambassador, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, that once the war was under way, Americans would be killing Arabs in Kuwait. “No problem,” Bandar replied.23

  “From the very beginning,” Baker wrote, “the President emphasized the importance of having the express approval of the international community if at all possible.”24 Bush saw the advantages in securing the acquiescence of the Security Council, building a large coalition of allies and regional powers, and ensuring the approval of the Soviet Union and the U.S. Congress before any military action. Baker wanted a specific Security Council mandate.25

  Britain’s then prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, thought otherwise. Thatcher believed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was a clear violation of international law and that Article 51, the Security Council resolution, and the call for Iraq’s withdrawal were sufficient authorization for collective military action. She did not think it was necessary to go back to the UN for approval of new action, and she worried that Bush might “go wobbly” rather than acting with decision.26

  As Baker recalled, Thatcher “wasn’t the least bit shy in expressing her serious misgivings about our preference for pursing a multilateral course.”27 Bush’s national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, supported Thatcher’s view. Where Baker and Powell favored maximum consultation, maximum UN authorization, and maximum delay, Thatcher thought Bush and Baker went too far in involving the United Nations in each step. In her memoir, The Downing Street Years, she recalled the “almost interminable argument between the Americans—particularly Jim Baker—and me about whether and in what form United Nations authority was needed for measures against Saddam Hussein. I felt that the Security Council resolution which had already been passed, combined with our ability to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defense, was sufficient.”28