Making War to Keep Peace Read online

  Thatcher was reluctant to involve the UN in details of the operation because “there was no certainty that the final wording of a resolution, which was always open to amendment, would be found satisfactory. If not, it might tie our hands unacceptably.”29 She added:

  [A]lthough I am a strong believer in international law, I did not like unnecessary resort to the UN because it suggested that sovereign states lacked the moral authority to act on their own behalf. If it became accepted that force could only be used—even in self-defense—when the United Nations approved, neither Britain’s interests nor those of international justice and order would be served. The UN was for me a useful—for some matters vital—forum. But it was hardly the nucleus of a new world order. And there was still no substitute for the leadership of the United States.30

  Later developments proved the prescience of Thatcher’s observations.

  The problem with seeking detailed authorization from the United Nations, Thatcher said, was that the UN was always engaged in a search for consensus, which she described as “the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values, and policies in search of something in which no one believes, but to which no one objects; the process of avoiding the very issues that have to be solved, merely because you cannot get agreement on the way ahead. What great cause would have been fought and won under the banner, ‘I stand for consensus’?”31

  Thatcher points up the basic problems in multinational decision-making and action. Governments have distinct interests and perspectives that make consensus difficult to achieve, and the need for consensus makes multilateral processes slow, cumbersome, indecisive, and inconclusive. Thatcher had already encountered this problem in negotiations on the European Union (EU), where she invoked the moral authority of the nation against the Brussels bureaucrats—and was frequently outvoted.

  Instead of acting under Article 51 to assemble forces immediately and act in defense of Kuwait, as Thatcher urged, Bush chose to seek specific authorization from the Security Council for each new step and to painstakingly build support through Baker’s extensive personal conversations around the world.

  In the end, discussions in the Security Council and in various national capitals produced the consensus Bush and Baker desired, a broad alliance, and the Security Council resolutions, including an ultimatum. Yet four months elapsed between the first resolution condemning the invasion on August 2 and the ultimatum on November 29, proclaiming that Iraq must withdraw its troops from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, or be driven out by force.

  During those critical months between the invasion and the beginning of the military operation, Kuwait was devastated. Its people were murdered, raped, tortured, and dispersed, its resources plundered and destroyed, the nation sacked. Much of this devastation could have been avoided by more rapid action. Though some time was required to assemble the necessary forces, earlier air attacks would have slowed the progress of Saddam’s forces. Resolution 660 on August 2 had already demanded that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. Resolution 678 added a deadline and authorized all necessary means to enforce the ultimatum.

  As the United States and the coalition went again and again to the Security Council for specific authorization, Margaret Thatcher went along, but she remained unconvinced to the end. She would write later that the slow beginning and unsatisfactory outcome of the Gulf War (by which she meant the U.S. decision to end the war and to leave Saddam’s military base intact) were direct consequences of the earlier decision to seek detailed authorization from the Security Council and to rely on the consensus of a diverse group of allies.32 Had the consensus road not been taken, she thought, the war might have been carried to a more definitive end. But Bush and his administration had their own views about legitimate force in the post–cold war world.

  Bush assumed the task of mobilizing U.S. forces, rallying a broad coalition in the Security Council, rallying support in Congress for military action if that proved necessary, and leading the military forces to victory.33

  Building Consensus in the UN and the United States

  The process of negotiating resolutions, constructing a coalition, and building majority support in the Security Council for the use of force was a landmark in the evolution of post–cold war conduct. The decision to defer action to build a consensus was unprecedented, as was giving priority to multilateral processes and collective action over a rapid response. Military action, when it came, had wide and explicit approval from the international community and the American government.

  Secretary Baker visited the heads of state in the major countries in Europe and the Middle East to explain the situation, argue the case for collective action, and secure their support and financial contributions. He later wrote that he and Bush saw this first international crisis of the post–cold war era as a critical opportunity to establish precedents.

  Bush and Baker hoped to persuade Saddam to abandon his occupation of Kuwait before the United States began a war, but he refused. Though strong and shrewd, Saddam repeatedly underestimated his opponents. He probably believed that the Gulf monarchies were too decadent to resist his attack on Kuwait, and that the rest of the Arab world was too divided to unite against him. Perhaps he believed he was already the leader of the united “Arab nation” he imagined. His speeches made clear that he believed other Arab governments would rally around him. His writing made clear that he saw himself as ferocious and unconquerable. He wrote:

  I’ve always preferred to make my decisions without the involvement of others. My decisions are hard, harsh, just like my desert. I’ve always related my behavior to the desert. Usually it looks so quiet and kind, but suddenly it erupts with rage, mightily fighting the gusts of storms and gales. And this outburst of the desert’s rage gave me the feeling that I was on the brink of the end of time.34

  Saddam gave many of the governments and people within his reach the feeling that they too were on the brink of the end of time.

  In an effort to make Saddam understand the opposition he faced, Bush advertised the strength and sophistication of the U.S. military power being assembled, and reiterated his personal commitment to the enforcement of the UN resolution. As Iraqi forces began to round up Westerners at gunpoint, Bush prepared for action. He provided leadership in the UN, where the United States was represented by Thomas Pickering, a skillful, politically savvy career ambassador.

  Bush and Baker worked hard to coax a diverse group of nations to participate without regard for the political quality of the allies assembled. When French president François Mitterrand made the point that Kuwait “is not the kind of government I would like to send French soldiers to be killed for,”35 Bush and Baker made the case for realpolitik. They believed that world politics sometimes drives governments to make alliances based on necessity as well as shared moral principles.36 Both understood that international politics may sometimes require alliances with unpalatable leaders or regimes. If opposing aggression, constructing new collective security arrangements, helping maintain independence and order in the world, and protecting world access to Middle East oil required collaborating with some governments whose principles and practices did not meet American standards, so be it.

  Bush was experienced in dealing with the governments of the Gulf and the world, and he responded eagerly to the challenge. “I enjoy trying to put the coalition together and keep it together,” he told reporters at a press conference in October. Dealing with the Gulf was more fun than dealing with Congress on taxes.37 But there were many pitfalls on the way to collective action.

  Peace offensives aimed at delaying U.S. action were launched, resisted, and defused. Bush believed a negotiated settlement was possible, but only on the condition that it did not leave Iraq the hegemonic power in the Gulf. Although he wanted to avoid war, he opposed appeasement. He had learned well the lessons of Munich and Vietnam. Still, he sent Baker to Baghdad after November 30 for a conversation with Iraq’s foreign minister Tariq Aziz, in one last effort to secure Iraq’s withdrawal from K
uwait.

  Confronted with unsatisfactory options, as well as Arab ambiguities, American impatience, and Saddam’s ambition, Bush chose his course. He believed that if Saddam should succeed in this act of brute force, his image and power in the Arab world would be dangerously enhanced; the governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Emirates, and Oman would be in continuing danger; America’s reputation in the world would suffer; American influence would shrink; and the opportunity to establish a new world order would be greatly reduced.

  For Americans, the challenge was to show Saddam that he could not succeed in the effort to annex Kuwait, and that there would be devastating consequences for trying. The United States had to communicate to Saddam that it would use the large military forces assembled in the Middle East. Any wavering in purpose, any seeming uncertainty, would undermine the effort. The United States was convinced that if Saddam Hussein could be made to believe he had only two options—withdraw from Kuwait or face total war—he would withdraw.

  * * *

  UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING IRAQ’S INVASION OF KUWAIT

  RESOLUTION 660, AUGUST 2, 1990: The Security Council condemned the invasion of Kuwait; demanded Iraq’s unconditional, immediate withdrawal; and called on both countries to begin negotiations. (Adopted 14-0; Yemen did not participate)

  RESOLUTION 661, AUGUST 6: The Security Council imposed a trade and financial embargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait; established a special sanctions committee to implement the resolution; and called upon UN members to protect the assets of Kuwait around the world. (Adopted 13-0; Cuba and Yemen abstained)

  RESOLUTION 662, AUGUST 9: The Security Council declared Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait null and void. (Adopted by unanimous vote)

  RESOLUTION 664, AUGUST 18: The Security Council demanded the immediate release of foreigners from Iraq and Kuwait and the right of diplomats to visit their nationals, and insisted that Iraq rescind its order closing diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait. (Adopted by unanimous vote)

  RESOLUTION 665, AUGUST 25: The Security Council called on UN members with ships in the region to enforce sanctions by inspecting and verifying cargoes and destinations. (Adopted 13-0; Cuba and Yemen abstained)

  RESOLUTION 666, SEPTEMBER 13: The Security Council reaffirmed that Iraq was responsible for the safety and well-being of foreign nationals, and provided guidelines for the delivery of food and medical supplies. (Adopted 13-2; Cuba and Yemen against)

  RESOLUTION 667, SEPTEMBER 16: The Security Council condemned Iraqi aggression against diplomats and diplomatic compounds in Kuwait and demanded the immediate release of foreign nationals. (Adopted by unanimous vote)

  RESOLUTION 669, SEPTEMBER 24: The Security Council emphasized that only the Special Sanctions Committee had the power to permit food, medicine, or other humanitarian aid shipments to Iraq or occupied Kuwait. (Adopted by unanimous vote)

  RESOLUTION 670, SEPTEMBER 25: The Security Council expanded the economic embargo to include air, except for humanitarian aid authorized by the Special Sanctions Committee, and called on UN member nations to detain Iraqi ships. (Adopted 14-1; Cuba against)

  RESOLUTION 674, OCTOBER 29: The Security Council demanded that Iraq stop mistreating Kuwaiti and other foreign nationals and reminded Iraq of its liability for damages to foreigners or their property resulting from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. (Adopted 13-0; Cuba and Yemen abstained)

  RESOLUTION 677, NOVEMBER 28: The Security Council condemned Iraq’s attempts to change Kuwait’s demographic composition and condemned Iraq’s destruction of Kuwaiti civil records. (Adopted by unanimous vote)

  RESOLUTION 678, NOVEMBER 29: The Security Council emphasized Iraq’s failure to withdraw from Kuwait as requested in Resolution 660 and subsequent resolutions; authorized use of “all necessary means” to implement 660 if Iraq continued in this behavior; and set January 15, 1991, as the date by which Iraq must withdraw forces or be driven out. (Adopted 12-2-1 Cuba and Yemen against; China abstains)

  * * *

  The New United Nations

  That it was possible to forge a consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Soviet Union38) and others regarding Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was a dramatic demonstration of how much the world had changed in a short time and what those changes meant for the UN. For the first time since the organization’s founding, a series of Security Council resolutions condemning aggression could be passed without cold war vetoes. A large majority of the member states condemned Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait, imposed sanctions, and authorized their enforcement by all necessary means. As George Bush told the UN General Assembly in September 1991:

  The United Nations, in one of its finest moments, constructed a measured, principled, deliberate, and courageous response to Saddam Hussein. It stood up to an outlaw who invaded Kuwait, who threatened many states within the region, who sought to set a menacing precept for the post–cold war world. The coalition effort established a model for the collective settlement of disputes.39

  This response was possible because of a new pattern of interaction in the UN. If Iraq, bound to the Soviet Union by a friendship treaty, had invaded Kuwait two years earlier, the Security Council could not have passed a resolution condemning the invasion. The Soviet Union would have called Iraq’s aggression a “liberation” that fulfilled age-old aspirations for the unity of two peoples wrested apart by colonial powers.40 (This was Iraq’s own rationale for the invasion.) Iraq could have counted on 100 percent support from the Soviet bloc and wide support from the nonaligned nations, among which the Soviets had broad influence. Internal divisions would have neutralized the Arab bloc and the Islamic Conference, and a long procession of speakers would have declared the condemnation of the invasion to be simply another machination of imperialist and Zionist powers, and Kuwait a corrupt remnant of the colonial era.

  For decades, aggression by the Soviet Union and its allies had been defined as liberation. For example, the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan were described as acts of international fraternal solidarity. But that era had passed. Instead of defending Iraq as a treaty ally, Dr. Nikolay Shishlin, political adviser to the Soviet leadership, pointed out that Iraq broke its 1972 friendship treaty with the Soviet Union when it invaded Kuwait. Shishlin said, “The people regard [the invasion of Kuwait] as a crime and a criminal act.” Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev’s closest adviser, Aleksandr Yakovlev, called the invasion a violation of “a moral law.”41

  For the first time, Soviet officials read the UN Charter as it was meant to be read, and the Soviet government joined in the series of resolutions. China, which usually avoids casting a veto alone, also joined in. An unprecedented consensus was born among the permanent members that held throughout the Gulf War.

  Securing the Support of Congress

  Some legal scholars have argued that a mandate from the UN Security Council is all the authorization required to legitimize U.S. military action. But that argument assumes that the Security Council’s decision overrides the requirement of the U.S. Constitution that Congress must declare war and tacitly transfers that authority in the U.S. government from Congress to the president, who decides how the United States will vote in the Security Council. President Bush saw his obligations differently. Just as he sought explicit approval from the Security Council for the use of force against Saddam Hussein, he also sought the support of Congress in committing U.S. troops to the conflict.

  Bush remembered the bitter debates when Lyndon Johnson failed to secure congressional support before plunging U.S. forces more deeply into the war in Vietnam. He wanted clear authorization from Congress, not a Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. UN Security Council Resolution 678, which set a deadline for Saddam’s withdrawal, was expected to help with Congress, but the Democratic leadership in both the House and the Senate—including House Speaker Tom Foley (WA), Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (ME), and Armed Ser
vices Committee chairman Sam Nunn (GA)—opposed the resolution requested by Bush.

  Most Democrats argued, along with Nunn, that rather than risking thousands of lives on a war on the other side of the globe, the United States should allow more time for the economic sanctions to produce the desired results.42 Most Democratic leaders in the Senate argued that Saddam could not indefinitely withstand the economic pressure of the sanctions. Mitchell charged that Bush was about to make the decision “prematurely.”43 Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) thought Iraq’s military strength was already being eroded.44

  Many arguments were heard for and against granting Bush the power to send American forces into combat. Some questioned the efficacy of economic sanctions in general and of these particular sanctions against this particular adversary. Others wondered whether denying Bush the authority to use force, or making him wait for such authority, would undermine U.S. credibility and render the threat in UN Security Council Resolution 678 (and subsequent UN resolutions) hollow.

  Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), an articulate supporter of Bush’s request, emphasized practical issues: the effect of any delay on the coalition against Saddam, on the uneasy allies in the Gulf, and on U.S. and other troops deployed in the area. Lieberman also raised the prospect that waiting might give Saddam time to perfect weapons of mass destruction.

  The debate considered whether Bush had exhausted all options and whether congressional authorization would encourage him to turn to war. It considered whether protecting the Gulf was a vital U.S. interest or merely an important one, and why countries that were more dependent on Gulf oil were not playing a much larger role in its protection. It was a searching debate, resolved by a narrow, largely Republican majority in the Senate (52 to 47) in favor of granting the authorization Bush wanted. The House approved the joint resolution by a wider margin (250 to 183).